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Abstract
This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee
data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first
to leave the firm. Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure
relative to the tenure of her colleagues). The identification problems for the wage
return to tenure are shown not to apply to the return to seniority because seniority
is not a deterministic function of time. Controlling for tenure, the probability of
leaving the firm decreases with seniority. The increase in expected seniority with
tenure explains a large part of the negative duration dependence of the hazard.
Using a variety of estimation methods, we show that a 10% increase in seniority
raises your wage by 0.1-0.2%, depending on the country and the method applied.
Conditional on ten years of tenure, one standard deviation of seniority raises your
wage by 0.5 to 1.6 percent.
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1 Introduction
Why does Lars earn a lower wage than Jens, while they have the same human capital
and work at the same firm? And why is Pedro fired and his colleague Miguel allowed
to stay, when their employer has to scale down employment? Some might think that
the answer to these questions is obvious: it is because Jens and Miguel are more senior
than Lars and respectively Pedro, that is, Jens and Miguel have a longer tenure than
Lars and Pedro, respectively. This paper provides empirical evidence supporting these
popular convictions. Using matched worker-firm data for Denmark and Portugal, we
show that a worker who is hired last, is likely to be fired first (Last In, First Out; LIFO
henceforth). Analogously, we show that there is a return to seniority in wages. Seniority
is different from tenure, in that it measures the worker’s tenure relative to the tenure
of her colleagues. The worker’s seniority is thus her rank in the tenure hierarchy of
the firm. When we claim that seniority affects your firm separation risk, we mean that
on top of the negative duration dependence of the hazard rate, being a senior worker
with many more junior colleagues has a further negative effect on your separation rate.
Similarly, when we claim that there is a return to seniority in wages, we mean that on
top of the return to tenure, there is a return to seniority. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to document the existence of a return to seniority in wages.
Why would firms and workers agree on applying a LIFO layoff rule, and why would
that lead to a return to seniority in wages? Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989)
develop a model that can explain these phenomena. Consider the standard monopoly
union/right to manage model, where the union bargains for a wage rate above the
market wage and where the firm decides on employment, taking this wage rate as given.
It sets employment below the efficient level. This outcome implies that gains from trade
between the union and the firm are left unexploited, since the firm would be willing
to hire additional workers for a wage in between the market wage and the wage rate
negotiated by the union. Kuhn and Robert suggest that the firm and the union could
achieve a Pareto superior outcome by agreeing on a hiring order based on seniority, and
a wage schedule that is increasing in seniority. This agreement would oblige the firm
to hire workers in a particular order, the most senior worker, with the highest wage
rate, first. If the wage schedule is properly set, the marginal worker hired by the firm
receives exactly the market wage, so that employment is at its efficient level. The higher
wage for inframarginal senior workers allows these workers to capture part of the firm’s
producer surplus. Kuhn and Robert elaborate these ideas in a static framework. In the
working paper version of this paper, we use the dynamic model of Bentolila and Bertola
(1990). We show that the firm and its workers agree on a wage profile where the most
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senior workers earn higher wages and are fired last.
Establishing a rate of return to seniority in wages is an exercise at the crossroad of
two topics discussed extensively in the literature on the earnings function, namely the
return to tenure on the one hand, see for example Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel
(1991), Altonji and Williams (1997), Dustmann and Meghir (2005), and Buchinsky et
al (2010), and the firm size-wage effect on the other hand, see for instance Brown and
Medoff (1984). Moreover, Neal (1995) has shown that the return to tenure at the firm
as measured by these authors is partly a proxy for a return to tenure in the industry
or occupation. Seniority is related to tenure, since a worker’s seniority is defined as
her tenure relative to the tenure distribution of the rest of the firm’s workforce. Hence,
within a firm, seniority is positively related to tenure by definition. Changes in seniority
are related to changes in firm size: an increase in firm size will always raise the seniority
level of the firm’s incumbent workers, since the newly hired workers have a lower tenure
than the incumbents. It is therefore crucial to adequately control for both the return
for tenure and the firm size-wage effect when estimating the return to seniority. The
literature on the return to tenure suffers from a serious identification problem: the
within-job spell variation in tenure is perfectly correlated to the within-job spell variation
in experience. Hence, the first order effects of experience and tenure cannot be identified
separately using solely within-spell variation. At the same time, the between-job spell
variation is endogenous, since workers decide to change jobs at least partly based on a
comparison of the wages in their current and their new job. Various papers have tried
different strategies to solve this endogeneity problem. The estimation of the return
to seniority as defined here does not face this identification problem, since the within-
spell variation of seniority is not perfectly correlated to experience. We line up to this
literature by applying the methods of both Altonji and Shakotko (who use job spell
fixed effects) and Topel (who uses within spell first differences) in our estimations. In
our empirical analysis, a worker’s seniority at a particular point in time is defined as a
function of the ratio of people hired before the worker and the total number of people
in the firm. The latter is equal to firm size. Hence, the return to seniority can be
distinguished from the firm size-wage effect by variation in the number of people hired
before the respondent. We enter log firm size as a regressor next to our seniority measure
to make sure that the estimated effect of the seniority is not a proxy for the firm size
wage effect. We need exhaustive linked employer-employee data for establishing the
workers’ seniority index, as we need to know the tenure rank of each worker in any firm
of our estimation sample. A full set of controls is added for the elapsed tenure in the
estimation of the separation rate. We find strong effects of seniority on the job exit
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hazard, such that the expected increase in seniority with tenure explains a large part of
the negative duration dependence of the hazard. Depending on the estimation method
that we apply, we find highly significant returns to seniority, in the order of magnitude
of 0.1 to 0.2% for every 10% increase in seniority for Portugal, and half that range
for Denmark. Conditional on 10 years of tenure, a one standard deviation increase in
seniority raises your wage by 0.5-0.6% in Denmark and 1.0-1.6 % increase for Portugal.
Section 2 discusses our estimation strategy, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4
presents the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation strategy
Define the rank qijt to be the log number of workers in firm j with tenure greater than
or equal to worker i (including worker i) at time t and define njt to be the log total
number of workers in the firm j at time t. Then, the seniority index rijt is defined as:
rijt = njt − qijt. (1)
Hence, the seniority index for the most senior worker is equal to the log firm size njt,
while the seniority index of the least senior worker is zero. If the LIFO separation rule
were to apply literally, then the seniority index rijt would be the only determinant of
separation since only workers with rijt = 0 would separate. In that case, a simple test for
LIFO would be to check whether there are workers leaving a firm with a rank different
from 0. In practice, this is not the case for several reasons. First, the workforce of the
firm is not completely homogeneous, so that a firm may wish to diminish its workforce in
one skill category, but not necessarily in other skill categories. This may disrupt a strict
application of the LIFO separation rule. Second, workers separate not only because of
shocks to the demand for the firm’s product, but also due to worker-specific shocks,
e.g., when a worker’s partner gets a new job and moves to another city. A particularly
important worker-specific factor in this context is retirement.
The seniority index rijt varies mostly in the upper part of the seniority distribution.
The index for the most senior worker is log 2 higher than that of the one but most
senior worker. The same difference applies to the 100th and 200th worker in the seniority
distribution. An alternative index shifts most of the variation in the index to the lower
part of the distribution. Define q∗ijt as the log number of workers in firm j with tenure




ijt − njt. (2)
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In the remainder of this section we only use rijt as the seniority index, but all our
empirical models are also estimated for the alternative seniority index r∗ijt.
2.1 The LIFO separation rule
We model the job separation process by a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model
with discrete-time periods. The probability of leaving the firm conditional on Tijt years








γ0rijt + γ1∆njt + γ2Zij,t−T + ψT + χj + vi
) , (3)
where Tijt is the elapsed tenure and Zij,t−Tijt is a vector of observed characteristics of
the worker and the job at the moment of job start (e.g., education and experience at job
start), and where vi represents the unobserved worker heterogeneity. The parameter χj
is a firm effect to allow for heterogeneity in turnover between firms. We include a full set
of dummies ψT for every tenure category (years), which is equivalent to a fully flexible
specification of the baseline hazard. This baseline also picks up the impact of experience
within a spell and also allows for the existence of a learning effect, see Jovanovic (1979).
Identification of the parameter γ0 of the seniority index rijt separately from the parame-
ters of the baseline hazard ψT requires variation in rijt that is independent of the tenure
Tijt. Such independent variation is available since the seniority index also depends on
the hiring and firing of other workers. Hence, it is a non-deterministic function of tenure.
We add the change in firm size as a regressor to control for heterogeneity between grow-
ing and shrinking firms, since shrinking firms are expected to have higher separation
rates. The LIFO-separation rule implies that controlling for the growth rate of the firm,
the separation rate is higher for junior workers, i.e. γ0 is expected to be negative. We
assume vi to follow a discrete distribution with a flexible number of mass points. In
our estimation procedure, we use the likelihood ratio to determine the number of mass
points. We use up to 10 spells of an individual, which helps to estimate the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution. We use a discrete-time model, since workers are observed
only once per year. Hence, we cannot observe the exact moment at which the worker
enters or leaves the firm.1 It also implies that short spells are underrepresented in the
duration data, since a worker has to stay at least till the next period of observation for
a spell to be recorded.2 We cannot correct for these problems with the data at hand.
1For Portugal, tenure is reported in months. We use this information in the estimation. For the rest
the modeling is the same for both countries.
2Note that this problem does not affect our measurement of the seniority index rijt, since for that
purpose we only need the distribution of tenure at a particular point in time.
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Equation (3) cannot be estimated with a full set of firm-fixed effects due to the
non-separability of the model and the large number of firms. Hence, we include fixed
effects only for the largest about 400 firms. In addition we also allow the coefficient of
rijt (i.e. γ0) to be different for these larger firms than for the smaller firms. What are
the consequences of omitting fixed firm effects for smaller firms? The estimate of γ0 will
be biased upwards, making it less likely that we find a LIFO effect (since γ0 is expected
to be negative). The reason for this bias can be understood by considering the case
without seniority effect, γ0 = 0. For the sake of the argument, we first ignore worker
heterogeneity. Consider two firms that differ only in their hazard rate, firm 1 having a
higher hazard rate than firm 2. Compare two workers with equal tenure, one in firm
1 and the other in firm 2. The worker in firm 1 will have a higher seniority than the
worker in firm 2. Not correcting for firm-fixed effects thus implies that the worker in
firm 1, with the higher seniority, is expected to leave that firm more rapidly and hence
the estimate of γ0 is expected to be positive. Worker unobserved heterogeneity has an
opposite effect because a worker who is still in a ‘high-hazard-rate’ firm after T years
is more likely to have a lower level of vi than a worker in a ‘low-hazard-rate firm’. This
shows the importance of correcting for worker unobserved heterogeneity, as we do in the
paper.
In our empirical analysis, we follow the convention to delete spells that are left
censored in order to omit the initial conditions problem, see, e.g., Lancaster (1990).
2.2 The return to seniority
The existence of a return to seniority in wages can be tested by extending the standard
specification of the log earnings equation with the seniority index rijt:
wijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt + β3rijt + β4njt + β5Zijt + εijt, (4)
where wijt is log wage and Xijt is experience. Higher order terms in experience and
tenure are included in the vector Zijt. The coefficient β4 captures the firm size wage
effect documented by Brown and Medoff (1989). Substitution of rijt as defined in (1)
into (4) yields:
wijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt + β3qijt + (β3 + β4)njt + β5Zijt + εijt.
The coefficient on the seniority index is identified separately from the coefficient on the
firm size by the variation in the log number of workers in the firm with tenure greater
than or equal to worker i. It is therefore important to include log firm size in the model
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to make sure that the estimated effect of seniority is not merely a proxy for firm size.
Following Topel (1991) the unobservable term can be decomposed into four orthog-
onal components: a match, a firm, a worker, a time, and an idiosyncratic effect:
εijt = ϕij + ψj + µi + τ t + νijt. (5)
The idiosyncratic effect νijt includes measurement error. There are all kinds of reasons
for φij , ψj , and µi to be correlated to Tijt, see, e.g., Topel (1991) or Altonji and Williams
(2005). Learning and search theories imply that good worker-firm relationships tend to
survive as the worker and the firm learn about the quality of their match, and bad
matches are broken up, leading to positive correlation between ϕij + ψj + µi and Tijt.
However, Topel (1991) showed that there is also a reason for a negative correlation
between ϕij and Tijt, since workers change jobs to get a higher wage. Hence, workers
who recently changed jobs are likely to have found a job that at least made up for
the loss of their returns to seniority. There are two solutions to the problem of the
endogeneity of tenure: either using within job spell first differencing (FD), as applied
by Topel (1991), or adding fixed effects for every job spell (FE), as applied by Altonji
and Shakotko (1987). First differencing yields:
∆wijt = (β1 + β2) + β3∆rijt + β4∆njt +∆τ t +∆νijt. (6)
Adding fixed effects per job spell is equivalent to taking deviations from the mean over
a job spell:
w˜ijt = (β1 + β2) T˜ijt + β3r˜ijt + β4n˜jt + τ˜ ijt + ν˜ijt, (7)
where the upper tilde denotes deviations from the mean per job spell, e.g. w˜ijt =
wijt−wij·, with wij· the mean of wijt over a job spell. We exclude X˜ijt from (7) because
it is identical to T˜ijt. In both specifications above it is obvious that the first-order effects
of tenure and experience are not separately identified. This problem has troubled all
attempts to estimate the wage return to tenure. It led to a debate between Altonji and
Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991), and a large stream of subsequent papers. The perfect
multicollinearity of experience and tenure within a job spell rules out estimating the re-
turn to tenure using within-spell variation. Hence, researchers had to revert to between-
job spell variation. Topel (1991) establishes β1 by calculating wijt − (β1 + β2)Tijt and
regressing this variable on initial experience. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) use T˜ijt as
an instrument for Tijt in the regression of wijt; see Altonji and Williams (2005) for a
discussion of the arguments in favor of and against both methods. Happily, this problem
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does not affect the estimation of the return to seniority, β3, since the seniority index rijt
(or rank qijt, for that matter) is not perfectly correlated to Tijt. This means that we can
identify β3 using only within-job spell variation in wages, and we do not have to bother
about the selectivity problems that plague the estimation of the return to tenure. For
the sake of comparison, we report the estimated return to tenure using both Topel’s and
Altonji and Shakotko’s methodologies.
The choice between the FE and FD estimators depends on the error structure of vijt
and on the lag structure of the effect of rijt on wijt. The closer vijt is to a unit root,
the more efficient is the FD method. Previous empirical studies have typically found a
high degree of autocorrelation in vijt, even close to a unit root, see for instance Abowd
and Card (1979), Topel and Ward (1992), or Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). From that
perspective, equation (6) is likely to be most efficient. However, suppose there is a lag
in the effect of rijt on wijt, for example:
wijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt + β3
1
2
(rijt + rij,t−1) + β4njt + β5Zijt + εijt. (8)
Suppose that both wijt and rijt are close to a random walk. By incorrectly excluding the
lagged value of rijt from the model and by first differencing the equation, the estimated
coefficient will be underestimated by a factor two, since ∆rijt and ∆rij,t−1 are uncorre-
lated. The lagged impact of rijt will not be captured by first differencing. The same
applies for the lagged impact of njt. From that perspective, equation (7) is preferred,
since there r˜ijt and r˜ij,t−1 are highly correlated and hence whether equation (4) or (8)
is the right specification of the relationship between wages and seniority hardly affects
the estimated level of β3. Hence, one would expect higher estimates for β3 and β4 from
using equation (7) than from (6).3
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) found evidence for heterogeneity in the return
to tenure between firms and between workers. We can adjust equation (4) to allow for
this heterogeneity:
wijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2ijTijt + β3rijt + β4njt + β5Zijt + εijt.
Note that this specification allows for more than just firm heterogeneity, since it even
allows every spell to have its own linear coefficient for the return to tenure.4 In this
3We report robust standard errors, so that correlation between the residuals over time implied by
the unit root does not affect the validity of the standard errors.
4The cost of introducing this type of flexibility is that the second order terms of experience and
tenure are not identified using within spell differences in wages. Using assumptions comparable to
Topel, it is possible to estimate these in a second stage regression using the second order term of the
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case, the parameter β3 can be estimated by first performing within-spell differences and
then taking deviations from the within spell mean:
∆˜wijt = β3∆˜rijt + β4∆˜njt + ∆˜τ ijt + ∆˜νijt. (9)
We also report estimates for this method.
3 The data
For Denmark, we use the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), for 1980-
2001, which has been often used previously, e.g., by Mortensen (2003). IDA tracks every
single individual between 15 and 74 years old. The labor market status of each person
is recorded at November 30 of each year. The dataset contains a plant identifier, which
allows the construction of the total workforce of a plant, and hence of the firm as a whole.
We use information on hourly gross earnings, education, age, and on the plant’s location,
firm size, and industry. Industry is defined as the industry employing the largest share of
the firm’s workforce. Firm size is defined as the number of individuals holding primary
jobs in that firm, and earning a positive wage.5 The tenure of workers hired since
1980 can be calculated directly from the IDA. For workers hired between 1964-1980 the
tenure can be calculated from a second dataset on the contribution histories to ATP ,
a mandatory pension program. Tenure in job spells started before 1964 is left censored
(less than 3% of the observations, which we discard), but that still allows us to construct
seniority for everybody else. Potential experience is age-schooling-6.6
For Portugal, we use Quadros de Pessoal, for 1986-2009, provided by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Solidarity, also often used in earlier research, e.g. by Cabral and
Mata (2003). It is based on a compulsory survey of firms, establishments and all their
workers; compulsory participation enhances the data quality. The information available
is similar to Denmark’s except that workers’ tenure is directly reported; the industry
is the industry with the highest share of firm’s sales or, when allocation by sales is not
possible, the industry with the highest employment share. We use all full-time employees
in their main job, and working for a firm located in Portugal’s mainland. As noted in
Cardoso and Portugal (2005) the wage variable is registered with exceptional accuracy.
For both countries we use data for all private sector jobs, except for agriculture,
initial experience. Details of this procedure are available from the authors.
5We performed a robustness check using the number of registered workers at the firm instead of this
definition. The main results are not affected by this.
6For Denmark– but not for Portugal– we can construct actual experience. Using actual rather than
potential experience does not make a difference for the coefficients on tenure and seniority. For the
sake of consistency, we report results using potential experience for both countries.
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fishing and mining. We eliminate outliers by deleting all wage observations lower than
the legal minimum wage and dropping the top 1% of the wage distribution, for each
year. Unless otherwise stated, for both countries we use employment spells of men aged
over 25 years of age. The main reason to exclude younger individuals is to omit those
who are still in education; their wage increases within a job are unlikely to be affected
only by experience or tenure. We exclude women from our main analysis since they
are more likely to leave their job for reasons which are not captured by our model. In
addition, we use the location at the start of the spell and the same for industry. We also
exclude workers above the age of 55 from the LIFO duration analysis (but not from the
construction of seniority and the wage analysis), and spells started before the age of 55
and finished afterwards are taken as right censored. Note that the seniority variables
rijt and r
∗
ijt are calculated before any data deletion.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics Denmark and Portugal
DK 1980-2001 DK 2000 PT 1986-2009 PT 2000
Variable
Age 40.9 41.51 40.51 40.51
(10.54) (10.65) (10.49) (10.52)
Years of education 12.35 12.87 6.86 6.85
(3.14) (2.81) (3.73) (3.63)
Tenure 6.15 5.77 9.30 9.26
(6.04) (6.08) (9.04) (9.28)
Experience 22.93 23.41 24.04 24.05
(11.14) (10.73) (10.81) (10.85)
Log seniority 0.7 0.66 0.86 0.86
(0.75) (0.75) (0.85) (0.84)
Log firm size 4.7 4.77 4.14 4.05
(2.33) (2.35) (2.11) (2.14)
Log wage 3.15 3.2 1.52 1.61
(0.3) (0.32) (0.53) (0.52)
Sample size
Observations 12634236 626867 15371019 725729
Workers 1412646 626867 2931323 725729
Firms 221807 60236 458888 124621
Spells 3456711 626867 4662627 725729
Notes: Standard deviations of variables in parentheses under their
means. Log wages are expressed in euro and deflated to year 2000
prices.
Summary statistics for both countries are presented in Table 1, both for the pooled
data, and for the year 2000 separately. While some statistics like the mean age or mean
potential work experience are similar in both countries, there are also several striking
differences. For instance, in 2000, the education level in Denmark is five years higher
than in Portugal and at the same time, Danes stay on average almost 3 and a half years
less at one firm than the Portuguese. The number of firms in the sample is more than
double in Portugal relative to Denmark, but the average firm size in Portugal is only
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half of that in Denmark. Finally, Danes earn on average almost five times more than
Portuguese.
4 Results
4.1 The LIFO-separation rule
Table 2 lists the estimation results for the discrete-time MPH model described in section
2.1 using the seniority index rijt and Table 3 lists the results for that model using the
alternative seniority index r∗ijt. The vector Zijt includes start-of-spell levels of education
and experience and dummies for region and industry. We include 333 firm dummies for
Denmark and 413 for Portugal. About 20 percent of the Danish workforce is employed
in these firms and the smallest of these firms employs 273 workers; these figures are 8
percent and 177 for Portugal. We estimate the impact of the varying seniority index on
the hazard rate for all firms with an additive term for the large firms. For computational
reasons, we use a sample of 5 percent of the total population to estimate the MPH
model.7
Table 2: Results of the discrete-time mixed proportional hazards rate model using rijt
as the seniority measure
Country Denmark Portugal
# of mass points 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
rijt -0.2903 -0.2950 -0.2748 -0.2769 -0.1103 -0.1107 -0.1148 -0.1138
(0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0122)
rijt for large firms 0.1990 0.2467 0.1838 0.2076 -0.0824 -0.0765 -0.0729 -0.0732
(0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0406) (0.0452) (0.0468) (0.0471)
∆ firm size -0.0088 -0.0092 -0.0087 -0.0088 0.0072 0.0064 0.0065 0.0065
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Education -0.1169 -0.1586 -0.1666 -0.1653 -0.1979 -0.2327 -0.2364 -0.2361
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Experience -0.5249 -0.5954 -0.6325 -0.6198 -0.2063 -0.2473 -0.2545 -0.2653
(0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0229) (0.0259) (0.0270) (0.0271)
Experience2 0.0269 0.0281 0.0309 0.0298 -0.0072 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0076
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Experience3 (x100) -0.0571 -0.0555 -0.0644 -0.0327 0.0528 0.0610 0.0622 0.0599
(0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Experience4 (x1000) 0.0033 0.0027 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0076 -0.0087 -0.0089 -0.0087
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Number of observations 355197 355841
Mean log likelihood -2.8441 -2.8432 -2.8124 -2.8122 -1.4549 -1.4382 -1.4369 -1.4369
Notes: The estimation also controls for region, industry indicators and dummies for the largest
firms (333 for Denmark and 413 for Portugal). Standard errors in parentheses.
For both countries, we find a negative impact of the seniority index rijt on the
7The subset is made after the calculation of the seniority indices. We sample individuals eliminating
the risk that we oversample short spells while still being able to use the repeated spells of every
individual in our dataset.
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Table 3: Results of the discrete-time mixed proportional hazards rate model using r∗ijt
as the seniority measure
Country Denmark Portugal
# of mass points 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
r∗ijt -0.0497 -0.0104 -0.0004 -0.0047 -0.1354 -0.1225 -0.1223 -0.1223
(0.0081) (0.0092) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095)
r∗
ijt
for large firms -0.0236 -0.1434 -0.0887 -0.1224 0.0051 0.0078 0.0113 0.0114
(0.0120) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0273) (0.0304) (0.0310) (0.310)
∆ firm size -0.0085 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0086 0.0051 0.0064 0.0067 0.0067
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Education -0.1148 -0.1630 -0.1650 -0.1666 -0.1997 -0.2339 -0.2339 -0.2339
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030)
Experience -0.5167 -0.6236 -0.6270 -0.6155 -0.1982 -0.2400 -0.2420 -0.2419
(0.0070) (0.0101) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0229) (0.0258) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Experience2 0.0266 0.0308 0.0308 0.0297 -0.0078 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0087
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Experience3 (x100) -0.0567 -0.0654 -0.0644 -0.0609 0.0540 0.0620 0.0623 0.0623
(0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0059)
Experience4 (x1000) 0.0033 0.0039 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0077 -0.0081 -0.0089 -0.0089
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Number of observations 355197 355841
Mean log likelihood -2.8489 -2.8478 -2.8241 -2.8239 -1.4539 -1.4377 -1.4367 -1.4367
Notes: The estimation also controls for region, industry indicators and dummies for the largest
firms (333 for Denmark and 413 for Portugal). Standard errors in parentheses.
hazard rate, which is fairly precisely measured, in line with a LIFO-rule. Based on the
likelihood ratio test, a specification with more than 4 mass points does not significantly
improve the fit of the model. Moreover, adding more mass points does not have much
of an effect on the estimated effect of the seniority index. The differential effect of
seniority for large firms has opposite sign for both countries. In Denmark, seniority has
a smaller impact for large firms, while in Portugal, it is the other way around. For the
alternative seniority index r∗ijt the results are somewhat mixed. The alternative index
yields a substantially lower likelihood for Denmark, implying that the index rijt is better
capable of explaining the hazard then the alternative index. Hence, we discredit these
results. The effect for small firms becomes insignificant, while the effect for large firms
changes signs. For Portugal, the likelihood is somewhat higher for the alternative index,
although the difference is tiny, in particular for 3 and 4 mass points.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of tenure on the hazard rate. The solid line is the
baseline hazard ψT . In contrast to what is usually found, the baseline hazard is not
decreasing for both countries, at least not before ten years of tenure for Portugal, while
it is increasing for Denmark. As expected, this result is highly sensitive to the number
of mass points that is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity: if we do not include
unobserved heterogeneity (the model with one mass point), then the baseline hazard is
sharply decreasing. The absence of a clear pattern of negative duration dependence is
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also due to the inclusion of seniority in the model. Seniority is positively correlated with
tenure. Hence, the negative impact of seniority substitutes for the negative duration
dependence. The dotted line is the effect of mean seniority on the hazard, i.e. the
average seniority level for that level of tenure times the coefficient of seniority for the
small firms. We find that this negative impact roughly neutralizes the positive impact of


















































Figure 1: Baseline hazards and the contributions of average seniority to the hazard for
different levels of the tenure. The baseline hazards are for the model with 4 different
mass points
4.2 The return to seniority
First, we check the characteristics of the dynamic process of vijt. Table 4 reports the
variance-covariance of ∆vijt for the first six lags. For both countries, the covariance of εijt
with its first lag is substantial, the covariance with higher lags is negligible. Hence, the
process is well approximated by an MA(1) process, made up of a mixture of permanent
and transitory shocks. Abowd and Card (1979) and Topel and Ward (1992) find similar
results for the United States. The standard deviation of the permanent shocks can be
calculated as 0.10 for Denmark and 0.12 for Portugal.8 These numbers are of the same
order of magnitude as for the United States.
This evidence suggests that in terms of efficiency we prefer the first differencing
method as introduced by Topel, while in terms of allowing for a lagged effect of rijt on
wijt, we prefer the method of Altonji and Shakotko. Hence, we report results of both
8Let qijt and uijt be the transitory and permanent shock respectively. Then ∆vijt = uijt + qijt −
qij,t−1. Hence, Var(∆vijt) =Var(uijt) + 2Var(qijt) and Cov(∆vijt,∆vij,t−1) = −Var(qijt), so that
Var(uijt) =Var(∆vijt) + 2Cov(∆vijt,∆vij,t−1).
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Table 4: Residual autocovariances for within-job log wage innovations
















of observations 8902997 9884371
Notes: The generating regressions are the Topel re-
gressions with seniority index included, controlling for
time, industry, and location indicators. Only the first
6 lags are displayed here. Standard errors in paren-
theses.
methods in Table 5, Denmark in the upper, and Portugal in the lower panel. Our re-
gressions control for up to quartic terms in tenure and experience, for log firm size, and
for industry and region dummies.9 We present the estimation results for three specifica-
tions: the first specification excludes log seniority, the second specification includes the
seniority index rijt, and the third specification includes both seniority indices rijt and
r∗ijt.
10 All coefficients for the seniority index rijt are positive and statistically significant
and the coefficient for r∗ijt in most cases. The results for a straightforward OLS stand
out in their magnitude. This is the only method that also uses the between job spell
variation to identify the effect of seniority. The coefficients are larger for Altonji and
Shakotko’s method than Topel’s. This was expected because the method of Altonji
and Shakotko allows for a lagged effect of rijt on wijt, while the Topel first differencing
method does not. Comparing the estimation results with and without seniority, includ-
ing seniority reduces the coefficients for tenure and log firm size by 5− 30% (except for
the effect of tenure in Denmark, which is small anyway). The coefficients for experience
are hardly affected by including seniority.11 The effect of tenure and log firm size on
wages is at least partly a proxy for the effect of seniority. Finally, the effect of seniority
is twice as high in Portugal as in Denmark.
9Time effects are also accounted for in all subsequent wage analyses.
10The fourth possibility, using r∗ijt only, did not add new insights and is therefore not reported.
11Apparently, initial experience is not correlated with seniority, while tenure and firm size are highly
correlated.
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Table 5: Wage regressions for males
Denmark
OLS Topel Altonji and Shakotko Topel with spell fixed effects
I II III I II III I II III I II III
rijt 0.0416 0.0367 0.0077 0.0070 0.0104 0.0081 0.0104 0.0117
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
rijt 0.0197 0.0040 0.0188 -0.0058
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Log firm size 0.0126 0.0120 0.0129 0.0176 0.0126 0.0125 0.0308 0.0246 0.0246 0.0167 0.0095 0.0095
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Experience 0.0308 0.0299 0.0297 0.0443 0.0464 0.0460 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0164 0.0163 0.0166
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Tenure 0.0148 0.0007 0.0089 -0.0021 -0.0042 -0.0052 0.0067 0.0044 0.0008 -0.0099 -0.0030 -0.0055
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Tenure2 -0.1327 -0.0243 -0.0774 0.1004 0.1181 0.1279 -0.0320 -0.0141 0.0182 0.1152 0.1109 0.1157
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029)
Tenure3 0.0498 0.0084 0.0276 -0.0523 -0.0590 -0.0633 0.0057 -0.0008 -0.0132 -0.0515 -0.0574 -0.0512
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Tenure4 -0.0059 -0.0006 -0.0029 0.0083 0.0092 0.0098 0.0003 0.0010 0.0027 0.0081 0.0088 0.0080
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Portugal
rijt 0.0452 0.0575 0.0145 0.0208 0.0220 0.0173 0.0115 0.0043
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0015)
r∗ijt -0.0298 0.0166 0.0146 0.0183
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0012)
Log firm size 0.0519 0.0499 0.0443 0.0266 0.0173 0.0208 0.0561 0.0431 0.0466 0.0222 0.0146 0.0177
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Experience 0.0540 0.0563 0.0530 0.0685 0.0695 0.0677 0.0663 0.0654 0.0651 0.0134 0.0139 0.0146
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0215) (0.0132) (0.0115)
Tenure 0.0310 0.0235 0.0273 0.0187 0.0166 0.0124 0.0160 0.0135 0.0110 0.0426 0.0346 0.0280
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0217) (0.0140) (0.0130)
Tenure2 -0.1803 -0.1283 -0.1534 -0.0757 -0.0578 -0.0236 -0.0391 -0.0235 -0.0057 -0.2427 -0.2336 -0.1636
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0061)
Tenure3 0.0508 0.0331 0.0400 0.0227 0.0163 0.0557 0.0079 0.0029 -0.0022 0.1019 0.0989 0.0733
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0074)
Tenure4 -0.0047 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0040 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0088 -0.0085 -0.0055
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real hourly wage. All regressions also control for experience up to a quartic term, region
and industry. Standard errors in parentheses.
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We also report estimates of a method that first takes within-spell differences and then
takes deviations from the within spell mean to allow for match specific heterogeneity in
the tenure coefficient (as in equation (9)). The estimated returns to seniority are hardly
affected by this method as the return to seniority is identical to the method of Altonji
and Shakotko for Denmark while it is close to the return to seniority estimated by the
method of Topel for Portugal.
Might measurement error in tenure explain our results? Measurement error in tenure
is a general problem in the literature on the return to tenure. Apart from reporting
errors, the main source of measurement error in tenure is who exactly is the relevant
employer. Some job changes might either be classified as between firms, justifying the
tenure clock being set back to zero, or as within the firm, which does not affect the
tenure clock. In general, this type of measurement error decreases the returns to tenure,
while it may overestimate the returns to any variable that is correlated with tenure,
such as experience in the original papers that try to estimate the returns to tenure. But
what happens if both seniority and tenure are included in the same regression equation
as we do in this paper? We expect the measurement error of seniority to be larger than
the measurement error of tenure because misclassification of the years of tenure of even
a single worker affects the measurement of the seniority of all other workers in the firm.
The same is true for the log firm size. Moreover, the empirically relevant seniority index
might not be based on the total workforce of the firm, but on subgroups. Therefore,
seniority is not likely to pick up a part of the returns to tenure but instead it is the
other way around: part of the estimated effect of tenure and log firm size might still be
a proxy for measurement error in the seniority variable and the actual effect of seniority
on wages can be expected to be larger than estimated here.
Table 6 illustrates the impact of seniority on the wage increments within a job for
different years of tenure. We find that the wage increments are highest in Portugal:
based on the results of the methods of Topel and Altonji and Shakotko, we find that after
10 years of tenure the wage is almost 14 percent higher than at the start of the job spell.
This is only 4 percent in Denmark. In addition, we find that a one standard deviation
increase in seniority (from the perspective of the mean seniority level of individuals with
a tenure of 10 years) results in a wage increase of 0.5-0.6 percent in Denmark and 1.0-1.6
percent in Portugal.
4.2.1 Returns to seniority within gender and education subgroups
The LIFO layoff rule is unlikely to apply unconditionally. One would expect the firm
to apply separate layoff rules for different subgroups of its workforce. For example, a
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Table 6: The effect on log wages of tenure (at mean seniority) and of one standard
deviation of seniority
Altonji and Topel with
Tenure OLS Topel Shakotko firm effects
(in years) Tenure Std. dev. Tenure Std. dev. Tenure Std. dev. Tenure Std. dev.
rank rank rank rank
Denmark
2 0.0168 0.0109 -0.0020 0.0020 0.0109 0.0027 0.0012 0.0027
5 0.0372 0.0189 0.0007 0.0035 0.0254 0.0047 0.0154 0.0047
10 0.0482 0.0244 0.0350 0.0046 0.0408 0.0061 0.0515 0.0061
15 0.0527 0.0284 0.0613 0.0053 0.0504 0.0071 0.0873 0.0071
20 0.0594 0.0314 0.0770 0.0059 0.0581 0.0079 0.1134 0.0078
Portugal
2 0.0556 0.0235 0.0376 0.0067 0.0362 0.0103 0.0465 0.0054
5 0.1049 0.0302 0.0806 0.0087 0.0777 0.0132 0.0860 0.0070
10 0.1552 0.0358 0.1369 0.0104 0.1363 0.0156 0.1169 0.0082
15 0.1785 0.0377 0.1818 0.0109 0.1844 0.0164 0.1513 0.0086
20 0.1976 0.0401 0.2252 0.0116 0.2296 0.0175 0.2341 0.0092
Note: Both the mean and the standard deviation of seniority are calculated conditional on tenure.
construction firm is unlikely to fire its secretaries if it has an excess supply of bricklayers,
whatever the seniority of both groups of workers. One can therefore expect the theory
to work better using separate seniority indices computed for broad groups of workers.12
We use males versus females, and low versus higher educated workers. For gender we
look at the seniority relative to all workers within the firm, while for education level it
is the seniority relative to workers within the same education class.
The results are reported in Table 7. The results for the group of men are similar
to the results in Table 5. The differences between men and women are small. In
Denmark, seniority has a higher impact for women than for men while in Portugal this
is the reverse. The effect of seniority is larger for higher educated workers than for low
educated workers, except for Portugal when using the method of Altonji and Shakotko.
These results are consistent with the fact that high educated workers have steeper wage-
tenure profiles than their low-educated peers. At the same time, they give support to
the idea that the relevant seniority index is not defined for the firm as a whole, but for
various subgroups within the firm.
12One could calculate separate indices for each occupation. Apart from the fact that we do not have
a good classification of occupations in our data, we hesitate to distinguish workers by their occupation,
since that might change endogenously. The wage increase due to a rise in the worker’s seniority is likely
correlated with a relabeling of her occupation.
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Table 7: FE and FD Regressions by Gender and Education Rank Groups
Denmark Portugal
Gender Categories
Females Males Females Males
Topel AS Topel AS Topel AS Topel AS
Seniority index (rijt) 0.0109 0.0107 0.0077 0.0104 0.0117 0.0122 0.0145 0.0220
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Log firm size -0.0004 0.0122 0.0126 0.0246 0.0154 0.0463 0.0173 0.0431
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Experience 0.0337 0.0005 0.0464 -0.0004 0.0516 0.0534 0.0695 0.0654
(0.0006) (0.00004) (0.0004) (0.00003) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Tenure -0.0015 0.0039 -0.0042 0.0044 0.0206 0.0163 0.0166 0.0135
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Number of observations 5049388 7745676 9858509 14618407 2300767 4353808 3457888 6389436
Education Categories
High educated Low educated High educated Low educated
Topel AS Topel AS Topel AS Topel AS
Seniority index (rijt) 0.0124 0.0207 0.0037 -0.0044 0.0226 0.0122 0.0140 0.0196
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Log firm size 0.0098 0.0207 0.0172 0.0299 0.0140 0.0463 0.0148 0.0381
(0.0004) (0.0002) (.0005) (0.0003) (.0017) (0.0002) (.0004) (.0002)
Experience 0.0450 0.0034 0.0304 0.0003 0.0723 0.0697 0.0471 0.0464
(0.0005) (0.00004) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (.0001) (.0002)
Tenure -0.0053 -0.0009 -0.0024 0.0028 0.0206 0.0163 0.0159 0.0130
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Number of observations 9567345 14054988 5268672 8309095 259793 536920 5492034 10206324
Notes: The dependent variable is the time-detrended log real hourly wage. Seniority index has been
computed separately for each category. Low educated stands for category of people with at most 12
years of education. All regressions include also up to 4th order polynomials in tenure and experience and
indicators for region and industry. AS stands for Altonji and Shakotko. Standard errors in parentheses.
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5 Conclusion
We have shown that there exists a return to seniority in wages in both Denmark and
Portugal, with an elasticity in the order of magnitude of 0.01– 0.02: a 10% increase in
your seniority (10% in the number of workers more senior than you) raises your wage
by 0.1 to 0.2%, depending on the estimation method and on the country or subgroup
under consideration. Conditional on your tenure, a one standard deviation increase in
your seniority raises your wage by 0.5-1%. We have also shown, for both countries, that
the last workers hired are the ones most likely to separate from the firm. While we
have established these two facts for Denmark and Portugal, whether they exist in other
countries– in particular in the United States– remains an open question. On the one
hand, one might argue that the returns to seniority might be largely driven by legal
institutions, which are different in the United States. On the other hand, the economic
mechanisms leading to a layoff rule operate everywhere and legal institutions are just
a formalization of rules of conduct that would have emerged anyway. Hence, repeating
this analysis for the United States and other countries is a worthwhile exercise.
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